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Abstract 
This study links corporate reputation, as measured by Fortune 
magazine's Most Admired list, with firm financial performance. 
Seven measures of financial risk and return were collected for a 
sample of 149 firms from two time periods, 1981 and 1986. The 
mean score of four attributes from the 1993 Fortune Most Admired 
list for the sample was then analyzed with the financial data 
through regression analysis. Two financial variables, Standard 
Deviation of the Market Return of the Firm and Return on Sales, 
explained between .12 and .14 of subsequent reputation. The 
implication for management is that they can affect a firm's 




Investment bankers, corporate managers, recruiters, among others, 
routinely rely on reputations of firms in making a variety of 
decisions. A firm's reputation sends signals to these 
stakeholders about its products and business strategies compared 
to other firms within similar industries. Favorable reputations 
have been linked to the generation of above average returns for a 
firm, job candidates• initial decisions about pursuing contact 
with a firm, and in some cases, the firm's social responsibility 
(Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Fryxell and Wang, 1994; Gatewood, 
Gowan and Lautenschlager, 1993; and McGuire, Sundgren and 
Schneeweis, 1988}. The purpose of this study was to examine the 
relationship between a firm's past financial performance and its 
subsequent reputation over an extended period of time. 
The relationship between a firm's reputation and its financial 
performance is complex. There are various reasons for this 
complexity. The first reason is that it takes profit to have the 
funds to invest in socially responsible activities. Cyert and 
March (1963) proposed that if an organization has slack, e. g., 
excess profits, this creates opportunities for the organization 
to invest in more socially responsible behaviors that satisfy 
stakeholder expectations than if the firm has little or no slack. 
To the degree that firms with slack do engage in discretionary 
socially responsible programs, these programs may increase the 
firm's reputation over later periods of time. Those firms 
without slack are at an economic disadvantage and therefore have 
less resources available to direct toward socially responsible 
behaviors. 
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A second reason for this complexity is explained through 
stakeholder theory. Cornell and Shapiro (1987) and Chakravarthy 
(1986) suggest that all stakeholders must be equally satisfied. 
Every firm has a broad range of stakeholders. Satisfying one 
group can be at the expense of another group. Cornell and Shapiro 
divide stakeholders into two groups; those that have an explicit 
contract with the firm (e.g., stockholders, bondholders) and 
those that have implicit contracts with the firm (e.g., 
customers, employees). If the implicit contract stakeholders 
become dissatisfied, they may try to exchange their implicit 
contract into a more explicit one. For example, if employees 
doubt the firm's implied employment contract, they may choose to 
unionize and thus create an explicit agreement. Besides the 
direct increase in dollars, an explicit agreement generally 
limits the firm's flexibility in work policies and procedures. 
The third reason is that corporate reputation often represents 
stakeholders' perception of the quality of the firm's management. 
Researchers have found that stakeholders view a firm's reputation 
for social responsibility as one indication of its top managers' 
ability to effectively manage the firm within the changing 
environment (Alexander and Bucholtz, 1978; Bowman and Haire, 
1975; Miles, 1987; Sethi, 1975; Sonnenfeld, 1981; and Ullmann, 
1985). A decline in a firm's reputation for social 
responsibility may signal to stockholders that top managers are 
not scanning and interpreting their environment accurately and 
that management changes may be necessary to achieve a better 
"fit." 
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Perceptions of a firm's low social responsibility may also 
decrease the firm's ability to obtain capital at consistently 
favorable rates. Investors may consider less socially responsible 
firms to be riskier investments because of the possibility of 
government intervention. In contrast, if a firm is viewed as 
socially responsible, it may have a relatively low financial risk 
as a result of its more favorable relationship with the financial 
community. Firms that can borrow at lower rates can more easily 
satisfy their stakeholders claims than firms without this ability 
(Cornell and Shapiro, 1987). Socially responsible firms also. may 
have lower perceived market risk because they appear more 
sensitive to external events and thus are able to anticipate and 
'control' their changing environment. 
Another reason for mixed results in this field is that many 
researchers have used concurrent measures of social 
responsibility and economic performance. McGuire, et al. (1988) 
studied the relationship between financial performance and social 
responsibility over a ten-year period. There was little 
association between concurrent measures of social responsibility 
and stock-based measures of performance, although three 
accounting-based measures (return on assets, total assets and 
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operating income growth) were significantly correlated with 
firms• social responsibility. A firm's past financial 
performance effect on its subsequent reputation for social 
responsibility has met with mixed results. Return on assets, 
sales growth, and asset growth were positively correlated with 
later perceptions of social responsibility. Risk measures 
correlated negatively with corporate social responsibility 
suggesting that a "low-risk firm and a firm with high return on 
assets will later have an image of high social responsibility 
(McGuire et al., p. 865) • 11 Risk and return on assets were able 
to predict between 19 and 13 percent of a firm's future social 
responsibility reputation. McGuire et al. (1988) suggest that 
future researchers consider financial performance as a variable 
influencing social responsibility reputation rather than social 
responsibility reputation influencing financial performance. over 
time, firms with high financial performance and low risk may be 
better able to afford to act in socially responsible behaviors 
than firms with low performance. 
High concurrent correlations between social responsibility and 
financial performance may be artifacts of a researcher's 
measurement system. Since a firm's current financial performance 
may be explained partially by examining the firm's previous 
performance, researchers need to use longitudinal designs that 
measure performance at several points in time. 
Furthermore, without a widely accepted measure of social 
responsibility, it is difficult for researchers to replicate the 
findings of others. The literature reflects three widely used 
measures of social responsibility. First, experts are asked to 
evaluate a firm's corporate policies according to some 
established criteria. The validity of this measurement resides 
in the expertise of those persons making the assessments. 
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Second, researchers have used content analysis of corporate 
annual reports and other documents to assess a firm's social 
responsibilities. Unfortunately, many of these documents are 
often of more public relations than informational value since 
many annual reports are written by professional public relations 
staffs. A third method has been to use Fortune magazine's list 
of the most admired companies. This measure has been widely used 
in prior studies {McGuire, et al., 1988; Fombrun and Shanley, 
1990; Gatewood, et al., 1993; Chakravarthy, 1986). The use of 
the Fortune index is not without limitations. Fryxell and Wang 
{1994) state that the Fortune data base provides an accurate 
measure of a firm's financial performance and should be used to 
complement other measures of a firm's performance as part of a 
multiple measurement strategy. Their factor analysis indicated 
that the Fortune reputation index loaded on two factors--
financial ends and capabilities and strategic means--that are 
highly correlated. They indicate that the raters• judgments are 
heavily influenced by their financial evaluation of the firm and 
argue that the distinction between the factors, as independent 
constructs, is unlikely. To assess a firm's reputation for 
social responsibility over time, we used four of the five items 
that Fryxell and Wang labeled capabilities and strategic means. 
These items measured the quality of management, its overall 




Data on a firm's reputation were obtained from Fortune magazine's 
annual survey of corporate reputations. Fortune has conducted the 
survey for the past 11 years and published summary results in the 
January/February issue called "America's Most Admired 
Corporations." Over 8,000 executives and outside industry 
experts are asked to rate organizations within their industry on 
eight attributes: financial soundness, long-term investment 
value, use of corporate assets, quality of management, 
innovativeness, quality of products or services, wise use of 
corporate talent and community and environmental responsibility. 
The rating scale is from o (poor) to 10 (excellent). 
The Fortune survey was chosen for several reasons. First, it 
provides comparable data over an extended period of time for a 
large number of firms in thirty-two diverse industries. Firms 
enter and leave the data set over time due to mergers or other 
changes in performance, but the sample is relatively stable. 
Second, the quality of respondents is comparable to those that 
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could be obtained elsewhere since respondents only rate firms 
with which they are familiar. They have direct access to industry 
information that is salient to assess a firm's reputation. Third, 
McGuire, et al. (1988), Gatewood, et al. (1993), Fombrun and 
Shanley (1990), and Fryxell and Wang (1994) have used the 
instrument as a measure of a firm's reputation. This permits us 
to relate our findings to a broader body of literature. 
To further refine the measure to reflect social responsibility, 
four of the eight attributes rated by Fortune's panel of 
industry experts were chosen as measures of social responsibility 
for this study. The four attributes are: quality of management; 
quality of products and services; ability to attract, develop and 
retain talented people; and community and environmental 
responsibility. The- logic for selecting these four attributes is 
that three of the other measures used by Fortune are surrogate 
measures of a firm's financial performance. The fourth Fortune 
attribute, a measure of innovation, measures how well management 
responds to all its customers' demands for innovative products 
andfor services. Fortune (1993) indicated that while financial 
performance indicators had the most impact 9n a firm's 
reputation, how a firm's management responded to its key 
stakeholders was a better measure of its reputation than 
financial indicators. A corporation becomes "most admired" by 
increasing shareholder wealth and through positive relations with 
key stakeholder groups. Key stakeholders include: customers, 
represented by the quality of products and services rating; 
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employees, represented by the measure of the ability to attract, 
develop and retain talented people; and the environment, 
represented by the community and environmental responsibility 
rating. Managing stakeholder relations and being aware and 
proactive to changes in the business environment is represented 
by the quality of management rating on the Fortune index (Miles, 
1987; Sonnenfeld, 1981; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Chakravarthy, 
1986; and Parket and Eilbert, 1975). 
A varimax factor analysis was performed on these four items to 
empirically confirm that four items used to measure a firm's 
reputation loaded on a single factor. A single factor was 
extracted (Eigenvalue of 3.48) that explained 87 percent of the 
variance. To evaluate the internal consistency reliability of the 
four rating scales, we calculated a coefficient alpha. A 
coefficient alpha of .95 was obtained indicating a high 
internally consistent measure. These four items were averaged to 
arrive at a score representing a firm's reputation for social 
responsibility. Although some modification in a firm's ratings 
might be expected' over time, we examined the ratings of a sample 
of 200 firms in the 1992 and 1993 Fortune list. The relationship 
between these ratings was .92, indicating a firm's relative 
stability in its ranking over time. 
Measures of Firm Performance 
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Ullmann {1985} has argued that conflicting results may derive, in 
part, from different measures of financial performance. For 
example, studies examining the relationship between social 
responsibility and accounting-based measures of performance have 
generally reported positive results (Parket and Eibert, 1975; 
Bowman and Haire, 1975}. Cochran and Wood {1984} also found a 
positive relationship after controlling for the age of a firm's 
assets. Spicer {1978b} and Aupperle, Carroll, and Hatfield 
(1985} found no relationship between market-based measures of 
performance and social responsibility. 
To address prior conflicting results due to the use of either 
market or accounting measure of performance, we used a 
combination of market based measures of risk and return and 
accounting measures of return. The market measures of risk are: 
standard deviation of the market's average return (STDV}, 
standard deviation of the market return of the company (STDC}, 
the correlation coefficient between the market rate of return and 
the average firm's market return(R} and Beta. Beta (BETA} is 
calculated by dividing the sum of the covariance of the market 
(STDV times R} and the covariance of the firm (STDC times R} by 
the squared variance of the market (STDV squared}. 
The accounting measures included return on sales (net income 
divided by sales}, asset turnover (sales divided by assets}, 
leverage multiplier (assets divided by equity}, and retention 
rate (!-dividends divided by net income). The rationale for 
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choosing the accounting variables was to represent measures of a 
firm's efficiency (ROS), production (AT), quality financing (LM), 
and opportunities for the use of capital (B). Retention (B) 
represents the firm's ability to invest capital in opportunities 
that will provide a better rate of return to shareholders than 
dividends. These measures provide data to the investor on whether 
the rate of return is sufficient to justify the risk. The 
accounting variables can also be combined to create the more 
popular measures of return; Return on Equity and Sustainable 
Growth. 
Periods of Analysis 
This study collected from COMPUSTAT seven measures of risk and 
rate of return from companies on the 1993 Fortune list for two 
time periods: 1981 and i986. The survey data reported in the 
1993 Fortune list was collected in 1992 and reflects a firm's 
1991 financial performance. Thus, a five and ten year time lag 
was employed. Various studies have used a five year (Alexander 
and Buchholz, 1978; Aupperle, Carroll and Hatfield, 1985; Bowman 
and Haire, 1975) and ten year (Abbott and Monson, 1979; 
Sturdivant and Ginter, 1977; Cochran and Wood, 1985 and McGuire, 
et al., 1988) period of time to study the relationship between a 
firm's financial performance and its reputation. Since return on 
sales and asset turnover do not have the same meaning in 
r egulated industries, onl y non-regulated firms were included in 
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the final sample. A total of 149 non-regulated firms were on the 
final list. 
RESULTS 
The study hypothesized that prior financial performance would be 
a salient predictor of a firm's future reputation as a socially 
responsible institution. Furthermore, we hypothesized that firms 
with higher financial returns will have achieved a higher score 
on Fortune's Most Admired List than firms with lower financial 
returns. 
Table 1 shows the correlation between a firm's financial 
Insert Table 1 about here 
performance in 1981, 1986 and their reputation in 1993. The 
level of correlation between prior firm performance and later 
corporate social responsibility is weakly supported. The standard 
Deviation of the Market (STDC) is negatively correlated with 
subsequent social responsibility for both years. This indicates 
that managers of firms that do not deliver the financial results 
expected by their shareholders were later perceived as being less 
socially responsible than managers of firms who delivered 
financial results expected by their stakeholders. Return on sales 
{ROS) was positively associated with later reputation. ROS 
measures the control of costs associated with obtaining sales. If 
a firm was able to control these costs, it was rated as being 
more socially responsible than firms that were not able to 
control these costs. There are mixed results for the other 
financial measures and later reputation. 
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The data in 1981 suggest that low-risk firms (as measured by 
Beta) and firms with high return on equity will have an image of 
high social responsibility. Unfortunately, the 1986 data 
indicate no support for this conclusion. High ROE in 1981 was 
positively associated with a good reputation in 1993. Once again, 
the 1986 data did not replicate these findings. 
To test the multivariate relationship between corporate social 
responsibility and prior financial performance, we conducted two 
regressions. Since the financial performance data are somewhat 
correlated with each other (average correlation is r=.16; R 
<.05), care must be taken when interpreting these regressions. 
The results of the stepwise regressions for 1981 and 1986 using 
Fortune's ratings of social responsibility in 1993 as the 
independent variable indicated that only two financial measures--
STDC and ROS--entered into the equation. The data in Table 2 
indicates that 13 percent of a firm's reputational rating in 
Insert Table 2 about here 
1993 could be explained by a combination of STDC and ROS in 1981. 
STDC explained almost 10 percent of the variance, while ROS 
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contributed 4 percent. The results from using a firm's 1986 
financial performance were similar to 1981 financial indicators. 
STDC explained almost 9 percent of a firm's reputational rating 
in 1993, and ROS contributed 3 percent. 
DISCUSSION 
The narrowest implication for management from our results is to 
control costs and deliver a return to investors as close to their 
expectations as possible. By achieving these goals, managers can 
control an average of 12% of their subsequent reputational score. 
This however, is a highly simplistic explanation. It is 
functional to look further into the question of stakeholder 
expectations to understand this relationship. Cornell and Shapiro 
(1987) theorize that stakeholders hold certain levels of 
expectations and will remain satisfied when their expectations 
are met. But what happens when their expectations are not met? If 
they don't get as much as they expected, they may choose to force 
a more explicit contract. Stockholders and institutional 
investors may become active and demand representation on the 
board. Customers may ask the government to intervene if they 
believe their expectations are ignored. All of these actions will 
cost the organization some autonomy in the way they conduct their 
business. 
The results of this study suggest that in order to have the 
autonomy to operate the business franchise, management must be 
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aware of and deliver the financial results expected by their 
stakeholders. This implies a much broader connection to 
stakeholders than previously conceptualized by past researchers. 
The traditional view of business as separate from society has 
evolved to how business legitimizes itself with society. The 
traditional way a business contributes to society and meets 
stakeholder expectation is through financial performance. Yet 
this suggests a precarious position for management; profit must 
be earned to 'pay' off the expectation of stakeholders, yet 
shortcuts that may lead to greater short-term profit may also 
create dissatisfaction with other stakeholders. This 
dissatisfaction could then result in a lower reputational score 
in subsequent years and a decline in profitability. 
Miles (1987), Ullmann (1985) and Cyert and March (1963) all 
theorize that the ability to manage their environment is a 
complex managerial process. Considerations included are the 
amount of power the stakeholders possess, the philosophy of top 
management on how to relate to the environment, and the amount of 
slack earned by past economic and behavioral performance. These 
researchers also make the point that a firm is most admired when 
it can transform itself to take advantage of changes in an 
unknown and changing environment. Firms must have slack in order 
to be ready to take action when it is needed. The most admired 
firms in our sample were able to generate more slack (Return on 
Sales) than less admired firms over time and therefore, enjoyed a 
higher subsequent reputation. 
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This study contributes to the understanding and theory that the 
construct of social responsibility ultimately seems to reflect 
the quality of management. The quality of management is the 
ability to anticipate problems and opportunities to meet 
expectations of all stakeholders and to be proactive in dealings 
with multiple stakeholders and the environment. The results from 
the study suggest that management will lower market risk by 
performing in a consistent manner. since most investors are risk 
averse and the classic tradeoff is risk vs. return, short-term 
profit should not be the sole goal of management. The implication 
for management is that accommodating the needs of multiple 
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